Modeling Human Behavior to Anticipate Insider Attacks by Ryan E Hohimer & Frank L Greitzer
Journal of Strategic Security
Volume 4
Number 2 Summer 2011: Strategic Security in
the Cyber Age
Article 3
Modeling Human Behavior to Anticipate
Insider Attacks
Frank L. Greitzer , Ph.D.
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, frank.greitzer@pnl.gov
Ryan E. Hohimer
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, ryan.hohimer@pnl.gov
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, National Security Commons, and the
Portfolio and Security Analysis Commons
pp. 25-48
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the USF Libraries at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
Greitzer, Frank L. , Ph.D. and Hohimer, Ryan E.. "Modeling Human Behavior to Anticipate Insider Attacks." Journal of
Strategic Security 4, no. 2 (2011): 25-48.
Available at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss2/3Modeling Human Behavior to Anticipate Insider Attacks
Abstract
The insider threat ranks among the most pressing cyber-security challenges
that threaten government and industry information infrastructures.
To date, no systematic methods have been developed that provide a
complete and effective approach to prevent data leakage, espionage, and
sabotage. Current practice is forensic in nature, relegating to the analyst
the bulk of the responsibility to monitor, analyze, and correlate an overwhelming
amount of data. We describe a predictive modeling framework
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"triggers" to help focus the analyst's attention and inform the analysis.
Designed to be domain-independent, the system may be applied to many
different threat and warning analysis/sense-making problems.
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Introduction
Imagine this (very general) scenario:
John has been a productive employee for several years, but is extremely 
disappointed when he feels that other coworkers have taken credit for 
some of his accomplishments and he is passed over for a coveted promo-
Abstract
The insider threat ranks among the most pressing cyber-security chal-
lenges that threaten government and industry information infrastruc-
tures. To date, no systematic methods have been developed that provide a 
complete and effective approach to prevent data leakage, espionage, and 
sabotage. Current practice is forensic in nature, relegating to the analyst 
the bulk of the responsibility to monitor, analyze, and correlate an over-
whelming amount of data. We describe a predictive modeling framework 
that integrates a diverse set of data sources from the cyber domain, as well 
as inferred psychological/motivational factors that may underlie mali-
cious insider exploits. This comprehensive threat assessment approach 
provides automated support for the detection of high-risk behavioral 
"triggers" to help focus the analyst's attention and inform the analysis. 
Designed to be domain-independent, the system may be applied to many 
different threat and warning analysis/sense-making problems.
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tion. Filled with bitterness and frustration after being accused of inap-
propriate conduct at work, he negotiates with an outside entity to exploit 
his position to the benefit of the competition, planning later to join the 
competitor's organization.
This brief scenario is a high-level description of a typical insider threat 
case. The insider threat refers to harmful acts that trusted insiders might 
carry out, such as something that causes harm to the organization or an 
unauthorized act that benefits the individual. Information "leakage," espi-
onage, and sabotage involving computers and computer networks are the 
most notable examples of insider threats, and these acts are among the 
most pressing cyber-security challenges that threaten government and 
private-sector information infrastructures. The insider threat is mani-
fested when human behaviors depart from established policies, regardless 
of whether they result from malice, disregard, or ignorance.
In the scenario above, if we jump back to the time of the Revolutionary 
War, we can see close parallels to the case of Benedict Arnold, who in 
1780 conspired with the British to work towards the surrender of West 
Point following events between 1777 and 1779 involving his being passed 
over for promotion and being accused of financial schemes. Viewing the 
general scenario in more modern times, one can see parallels with the 
career of Aldrich Ames, a CIA operative from the late 1950s to the late 
1980s. Ames initially received enthusiastic and positive reviews, but had 
continuing problems with alcoholism, security violations leading to repri-
mands, extramarital affairs that violated policy, and financial problems 
that reportedly led him to become a spy for the Soviet Union. In even 
more contemporary times, we may consider the case of accused 
WikiLeaks insider Bradley Manning, a despondent and disillusioned 
Army intelligence officer who experienced a series of emotional upheav-
als, including the breakup of a personal relationship, and whose disgrun-
tled and inappropriate workplace behavior led to his demotion to Private/
First Class before he allegedly leaked hundreds of thousands of U.S. 
Department of Defense and Department of State diplomatic cables.1
Surveys and studies conducted over the last decade and a half have con-
sistently shown the critical nature of the problem in both government and 
private sectors. A 1997 Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General 
report found that 87% of identified intruders into DoD information sys-
tems were either employees or others internal to the organization.2 The 
annual e-Crime Watch Survey conducted by Chief Security Officer (CSO) 
Magazine in conjunction with other institutions reveals that for both the 
government and commercial sectors,3 the most costly or damaging cyber-
crime attacks were caused by insiders, such as current or former employ-
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ees and contractors. A recent report covering over one hundred forty-
three million data records collected by Verizon and the U.S. Secret Service 
analyzed a set of one hundred forty-one confirmed breach cases in 2009 
and found that 46% of data breaches were attributed to the work of insid-
ers.4 Of these, 90% were the result of deliberate, malicious acts; six per-
cent were attributed to inappropriate actions, such as policy violations 
and other questionable behavior, and four percent to unintentional acts.
One might legitimately ask: Can we pick up the trail before the fact, pro-
viding time to intervene and prevent an insider attack? Why is this so 
hard? There are several reasons why development and deployment of 
approaches to addressing insider threat, particularly proactive 
approaches, are so challenging: (a) the lack of sufficient real-world data 
that has "ground truth" enabling adequate scientific verification and vali-
dation of proposed solutions; (b) the difficulty in distinguishing between 
malicious insider behavior and what can be described as normal or legiti-
mate behavior (since we generally don't have a good understanding of 
normal versus anomalous behaviors and how these manifest themselves 
in the data); (c) the potential quantity of data, and the resultant number 
of "associations" or relationships that may emerge produce enormous 
scalability challenges; and (d) despite ample evidence suggesting that in a 
preponderance of cases, the perpetrator exhibited observable "concerning 
behaviors" in advance of the exploit, there has been almost no attempt to 
address such human factors by researchers and developers of technolo-
gies/tools to support insider threat analysis.5
Both the similarities and differences in cases throughout history reveal 
challenges for efforts to combat and predict insider threats. While the 
human factor has remained somewhat constant, the methods and skills 
that apply to insider exploits have changed drastically in the last few 
decades. In the time of Benedict Arnold, and even up to the time of the 
exploits of Aldrich Ames and another notorious insider, Robert Hanssen, 
an insider had to possess requisite knowledge, direct access to the infor-
mation to be leaked, physical access to the recipient of the information, 
and a physical copy of the information to be exfiltrated. Compared to the 
WikiLeaks case, even twenty years ago it would have been necessary to 
use an 18-wheeler truck to transport the several hundred thousand docu-
ments involved in the WikiLeaks case. Today, insider crime does not even 
require specific knowledge of the information to be leaked, and gigabytes 
or more of information can be exfiltrated using various means, including 
thumb drives, email, and other modern information technology tools. 
Attribution is hard, and the ability to predict or catch a perpetrator in the 
act is severely limited, especially if the only means of detection is driven 
by workstation and network monitoring. Indeed, we have suggested that 
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the only way to be proactive is for the insider threat warning/analysis sys-
tem to take non-IT "behavioral" or psychosocial data into account in order 
to capitalize on signs and precursors of the malicious activity that are 
often evident in "concerning behaviors" prior to the execution of the 
crime.6
In this regard, research suggests that in a significant number of cases, the 
malicious intent of the perpetrator was "observable" prior to the insider 
exploit. For example, a study by the Computer Emergency Response 
Team (CERT) Insider Threat Center,7 a federally-funded research and 
development entity at Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering 
Institute, shows that 27% of insiders had come to the attention of either a 
supervisor or coworker for some concerning behavior prior to the inci-
dent. Examples of concerning behaviors include increasing complaints to 
supervisors regarding salary, increased cell phone use at the office, refusal 
to work with new supervisors, increased outbursts directed at coworkers, 
and isolation from coworkers.8 As described in a recent article on rogue 
insiders, the extensive and ongoing investigation of insider threat by 
CERT has determined that most cases carry a distinct pattern. According 
to CERT's technical manager Dawn Cappelli, "Usually the employees 
either have announced their resignation or have been formally repri-
manded, demoted, or fired."9 In such cases, the article continues, the 
Human Resources department is aware of these high-risk personnel. The 
malefactors typically may be categorized as falling into one of two groups: 
either those who are moving to a new job and want to take their work with 
them, or those who are part of a well-coordinated spy ring operating for 
the benefit of a foreign government or organization.
Goal of Insider Threat Research
In an operational context, security analysts must review and interpret a 
huge amount of data to draw conclusions about possible suspicious 
behaviors that indicate policy violations or other potentially malicious 
activities. They apply their domain knowledge to perceive and recognize 
patterns within the data. The domain knowledge that analysts possess 
facilitates the process of identifying the relevance of and connections 
among the data. In our examination of current practice by security, cyber 
security, and counterintelligence analysts, we have observed that typically 
the analyst uses a number of tools that monitor different types of data to 
provide alerts or reports about suspicious activities. This is primarily 
done in a forensic mode and within certain domains of data, such as 
output from Security Event and Incident Management (SEIM) systems, 
network and workstation/system log reports, web-monitoring tools, 
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access-control monitoring tools, and data loss/data leak protection (DLP) 
tools.10 While these tools provide varying levels of protection, they are 
primarily forensic in nature, and in general the analyst has the critical and 
difficult responsibility for data fusion that integrates the analysis and 
"sense-making" across these disparate domains.
To date, no systematic methods have been developed that provide a com-
plete and effective solution to the insider threat. Our goal is to create, 
adapt, and apply technology to the insider threat problem by incorporat-
ing into a reasoning system the capability to integrate different types of 
information that provide a useful picture of a person's motivation, as well 
as the capability and opportunity to carry out the crime. In this general 
context, our specific objective is to detect anomalous behaviors (insider 
threat indicators) before or shortly after the initiation of a malicious 
exploit.
Insider-threat assessment falls in the class of problems referred to as ill-
structured, ill-defined, and wicked. Rittel and Webber defined "wicked 
problems" as those having goals that are incomplete, changing, and occa-
sionally, conflicting.11 Klein suggests that most real-world problems are 
not well-specified and do not involve "explicit knowledge."12 Wicked 
problems defy clarifying goals at the start; we need to reassess our origi-
nal understanding of the goals, and goals become clearer as we learn 
more. Methodologies are heuristic, involving discovery and learning 
through an iterative process. Thus, the objectives, concepts of operations, 
requirements, and other dictates in the proposed research and develop-
ment are subject to periodic changes and maturation as the course of 
insider threat algorithms and software development matures.
The neocortex was the inspirational metaphor for the design of our rea-
soning framework, called CHAMPION (for Columnar Hierarchical Auto-
associative Memory Processing In Ontological Networks). The neocortex 
metaphor serves as inspiration for a functional (not structural) design 
that adopts functional requirements, as shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Functional requirements inspired by neocortex metaphor. 
The processing unit of the neocortex is the cortical column. For the 
CHAMPION reasoning system, the central processing unit is the Auto-
associative Memory Component (AMC), which mimics the functionality 
of the cortical column.
Multiple Domains of Data
The insider threat problem manifests itself within a socio-technical sys-
tem, a combination of social, behavioral, and technical factors that inter-
act in complex ways.13 Knowledge within each of the factors is captured 
(or modeled) in a domain-specific ontology. This modeling approach 
organizes the notional concepts within a specific domain into a hierarchi-
cal mapping of those concepts. The ontologies are used by the computa-
tional reasoning system to interpret patterns within the data.
The rationale for our approach of integrating across different domains of 
data is based on a body of scientific research and case studies in the field 
of insider threat, cyber security, and social/behavioral sciences, from 
which it has been widely concluded that behavioral and psychosocial indi-
cators of threat risk should be taken into account by insider threat analy-
sis systems.14 Indeed, Gudaitis and Schultz have separately argued that 
integrated solutions are required.15, 16 As Schultz observed, there is a need 
for a "new framework" for insider threat detection based on multiple indi-
cators that not only address workstation and network activity logs but 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4  No. 2
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss2/3
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.2.2Modeling Human Behavior to Anticipate Insider Attacks
31
also include preparatory behavior and verbal behavior, among others. 
Thus, analysis of workstation and network data is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for proactive insider threat analysis.
A recent review describes many technical approaches to intrusion detec-
tion (including insider threats) that may be characterized according to the 
categorization of techniques in terms of threshold, anomaly, rule-based, 
and model-based methods.17, 18 Threshold detection is essentially sum-
mary statistics (such as counting events and setting off an alarm when a 
threshold is exceeded). Anomaly detection is based on identifying events 
or behaviors that are statistical outliers; a major drawback of this 
approach is its inability to effectively combat the strategy of insiders to 
work below the statistical threshold of tolerance and, over time, train sys-
tems to recognize increasingly abnormal behavior patterns as normal. 
Rule- or signature-based methods are limited to work within the bounds 
of the defined signature database; variations of known signatures are eas-
ily created to thwart such misuse-detectors, and completely novel attacks 
will nearly always be missed. Model-based methods seek to recognize 
attack scenarios at a higher level of abstraction than the other approaches, 
which largely focus on audit records exclusively as data sources. A sample 
of data sources for host- and network-based monitoring data that are rel-
evant to insider threat detection is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Representative Host/Network Cyber Data Monitored for 
Insider Threat Analysis
•   Registry entries •   File permissions
•   Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) events
•   Access to account
•   Firewall logs •   Email content capture
•   Domain Name Server (DNS) 
logs/Internet sites accessed
•   Email headers
•   Host event logs •   Instant messaging
•   Host print logs •   Keystroke records
•   Network print logs •   Digital signatures
•   Database server logs •   Local stored or cached files
•   Web server logs •   Proximity card data
•   Search engine queries (from 
query logs)
•   Applications installed, patch status, 
version numbers for host computer
•   Known software signature
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Tools that focus on behaviors represent a significant advancement, but 
strict adherence to a statistically measured anomaly detection approach 
(which is in common use today) allows for gaps that may be exploited 
and/or go undetected. At the same time, tools that focus on policy viola-
tion assessment provide an effective first line of defense but allow for 
insider exploits that avoid policy violations. A more integrated approach 
that combines these functions would represent a modest advancement. 
Still better performance should be achieved by incorporating model-
based technology into an integrated analysis that includes more explicit 
"human factors" dimensions, as we describe next.
In keeping with an approach that attempts to reflect relationships 
between certain personality characteristics and counterproductive work 
behavior or higher-risk employees, we conducted discussions with human 
resources (HR) professionals and managers at our organization to iden-
tify behavioral "proxies" for such characteristics that may, to varying 
degrees, produce a heightened concern about possible insider threat risks. 
Informed by the Five Factor Model (FFM) and previous research and case 
studies documenting personality disorders and factors of concern,19 these 
discussions focused on the kinds of behaviors that would likely be 
observed and "known" by managers and HR staff because of the level of 
concern that they bring about. The model that evolved from these discus-
sions was therefore highly observation-based, i.e., focusing on observable 
behaviors that could be recorded and audited. Therefore, although the 
model is based on behavioral observables, it can support making infer-
ences about the possible psychological, personality, and social state of an 
employee; hence we refer to our model as a "psychosocial" model to cap-
ture the wide spectrum of inferences it is capable of producing.
The implementation of psychosocial reasoning used a data-driven 
approach based on personnel data that were likely to be available.20 The 
indicators used in the model, such as disgruntlement, anger management 
issues, and disregard for authority, are shown in Figure 2. It is worth not-
ing that these psychosocial indicators contribute differentially to the 
judged level of psychosocial risk, with disgruntlement, difficulty accepting 
feedback, anger management issues, disengagement, and disregard for 
authority having higher weights than other indicators, for example.
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Figure 2: Psychosocial Indicators. Based on our preliminary research, 
factors with solid/heavy outlines are considered more important than 
those with lighter outlines in determining insider threat risk.
Modeling Framework
A basic premise is the separation of the domain knowledge from the rea-
soning framework. If domain knowledge is hardcoded within the reason-
ing framework, then the framework's source code must be changed and 
recompiled whenever domain knowledge is updated. Equally important is 
the fact that this separation of domain knowledge from the reasoning 
framework maintains the domain-agnostic quality of the system, which 
enables its application to diverse problems without modification to the 
reasoning framework. We use the Ontology Web Language (OWL) as our 
knowledge representation language,21 which implements the ontologies 
and knowledge bases of the system.
The main components of the CHAMPION system are:
•   Ontologies, used for representing the specialized domain knowledge 
necessary to reason about the data. They provide the data-typing 
mechanisms.
•   Reifiers, used for the ingesting of the primitive data types that are spec-
ified in the domain ontologies.
•   Memory, used to store the facts asserted from the primitive data and 
the facts inferred by the reasoning system.
•   AMC (reasoning components), used to interpret the data assertions 
and infer new assertions.
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The analysis of real-world data presents a challenge to computationally 
analyze very large graphs. The difficulty is not so much a data reduction 
problem as it is a data interpretation problem. If we think of a reasoning 
framework as a graph structure, a traditional approach builds the graph 
as part of the knowledge engineering process and then, when applied, the 
system conducts reasoning over the entire graph. In contrast, the CHAM-
PION hierarchy of reasoners comprises a "stack" of individual AMCs such 
that lower-level AMCs feed higher-level AMCs. The graph structure is 
built as data are analyzed; this produces a dynamic belief propagation 
network that takes in primitive data and pushes the interpretation of that 
data up the hierarchy. We can think of this as interpreting the current 
structure in the data and simplifying it with abstracting semantics. Just as 
we can stack the AMCs, we can stack collections (regions) of AMCs that 
address reasoning or pattern recognition for different domains. Just as 
the AMC is analogous to the cortical column, the AMC region is analogous 
to a cortical region. Similarly, even higher-level collections of AMCs 
enable reasoning across such regions, providing a natural mechanism for 
high-level information fusion and analysis that is typically lacking in con-
ventional monitoring/detection systems.
The innovation of using a hierarchical framework of reasoners allows us 
to constrain the requirements of each reasoner to a narrowly-defined pur-
pose. We apply a semantic layer upon the data to enable graph-theoretic 
approaches for prediction, detection, and mitigation options. With a well-
formed semantic layer, we can overcome computational intractability by 
performing reasoning on subsets of the semantic graph of data: Rather 
than implementing a monolithic reasoner that is required to reason over 
all the concepts represented in the entire semantic graph, each reasoner 
in the hierarchy is only required to reason about a small set of relevant 
concepts.
The belief propagation network performs a transformation of the low-
level literal inputs into higher-level abstractions. As shown in Figure 3, 
the CHAMPION system takes in inputs from various sources and reasons 
about them. Ingesting and properly formatting the input data for a given 
domain is performed by a reifier, which instantiates the input from a data 
source and packages the information into an OWL representation called 
an individual. In turn these individuals are instantiated in java objects 
called abstractions. The abstractions are added to the Working Memory 
of the CHAMPION system.
Reifiers are responsible for asserting OWL individuals (primitives) into 
the Working Memory via abstractions. Although great care has been 
taken to make sure that AMCs are domain-agnostic, it is not possible to 
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keep the reifiers domain-agnostic. The reifier takes in raw literal data and 
forms an OWL individual that is defined by the domain ontology. When 
raw data needs to be reified, specific code is required to convert the raw 
data into a data-type defined in the domain ontology.
Figure 3: Functional Layout of CHAMPION Reasoning Process
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For example, consider a reifier that is responsible for sensing information 
from a computer's security event log. The computer system logs security 
events. The responsibility of the reifier is to parse the security event logs 
and instantiate OWL individuals, wrap them in an abstraction, and add 
the abstraction into the Working Memory. The reifier must parse each 
line of the security event log and instantiate a single SecurityEvent indi-
vidual, where the SecurityEvent is a class defined in the domain ontology. 
This abstraction is then inserted into the Working Memory. The AMCs 
(organized into various hierarchies, as indicated by the colored squares in 
Figure 3) further classify the SecurityEvent abstraction. Figure 4 illus-
trates this process in more detail. Here, an AMC focusing on failed login 
attempts checks the state of the subscribed SecurityEvent to determine if 
it matches a hypothesized pattern (in this case the main requirement 
would be that its event ID has a value of 529); and if a match occurs, this 
even may be typed as a FailedLogin, and a "FailedLogin" assertion is 
stored in Working Memory.
Figure 4: Illustration of process in which AMC subscribes to individu-
als deposited in Working Memory, analyzes the data, and deposits New 
Abstraction into Working Memory.
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From a high-level perspective, the AMC subscribes to abstractions from 
Working Memory and publishes (infers) new abstractions back to Work-
ing Memory. In the CHAMPION system, the term "memory" refers to a 
machine-readable Knowledge Base (KB). A machine-readable KB stores 
knowledge in a form that can be processed by an inference engine to 
accomplish deductive reasoning about new knowledge inferable from cur-
rent knowledge. A KB constructed with OWL is a collection of individuals, 
or instantiations of the class types defined in the domain ontology, which 
take the form of a semantic graph. A semantic graph comprises a set of 
nodes (the individuals) and the associated relationships (properties) 
among them. Therefore, we define a memory as a semantic graph of an 
individual, or individuals, in OWL format. There are several KBs in the 
CHAMPION system:
•   Working Memory (also known as Short-Term Memory) stores the sys-
tem's growing semantic graph
•   Sensory Memory (localized memory in the AMC) stores the current 
inputs being reasoned over by the AMC between input cycles
•   Episodic Memory (the memories of experience) stores the case library 
of the AMC and localized memory in the AMC
The process performed by the AMC within the belief propagation network 
of reasoners is shown in Figure 5. The system takes in data with no 
semantic tagging. The domain knowledge expressed in the domain ontol-
ogy provides the data typing (semantic layer) which allows for the seman-
tic tagging of the primitive data types being input into the system via the 
reification process. Once the "literal" facts are in the graph, the AMCs 
begin the process of further abstraction. New higher-level facts are added 
to the graph when the salient facts are present. The individual AMCs in 
the belief propagation network execute this process on the small sub-
graphs of the larger semantic graph.
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Figure 5: Recognition of Inputs and Adding Their Abstractions
Within each AMC there is a modified Knowledge Intensive Case-Based 
Reasoning (KI-CBR) structure.22 Unlike traditional Case-Based Reason-
ing (CBR) systems that compare the current case under consideration 
with each case retained in their library of base cases,23 this modified 
knowledge-intensive CBR approach uses formal ontological technologies 
to reason about the current case.24 The reasoning approach uses Seman-
tic Web Rule Language (SWRL) expressions.25 If the SWRL rules can suc-
cessfully construct a logically consistent abstraction from the current 
case, the case is added to the library of base cases and asserted back into 
the large semantic graph. This methodology offers two opportunities for 
the system to "learn:" First, the operator of the belief propagation net-
work can provide feedback in the form of edits to the SWRL rule expres-
sions that the reasoner uses to recognize abstractions. This is a direct 
editing of the description logics used to define the abstractions.26 Second, 
once a sufficient number of cases have been added to the library of base 
cases, statistical analysis of the library can lead to SWRL rule modifica-
tions that can better classify future cases.
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This implementation is quite different from the classical approach to 
CBR. The classical approach to CBR is to retrieve cases similar to the cur-
rent problem from a case library. Then each case is reviewed to see if it is a 
viable solution to the problem. If it is, apply the solution and go on to the 
next problem. If there are no viable solutions in the library, the most sim-
ilar case is revised to be a viable solution. If the new solution works, the 
case is retained in the library for future use.
Operational Perspective
The "big picture" of the overall reasoning process implemented within the 
insider threat application of the CHAMPION system is shown in Figure 6. 
As described originally by Greitzer and colleagues, we envision the pro-
cess of model-based reasoning that analyzes patterns of activity from data 
to observations to indicators to behaviors.27
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Figure 6: Conceptual model for reasoning framework conveys a sense-
making task as assembling a complex puzzle through an abstraction 
process (dataJobservationJindicatorJbehavior). Middle portion of 
the figure portrays the hierarchical system of reasoners that implements 
the abstraction process.
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In an operational form, the CHAMPION system ingests (reifies) data from 
a variety of data sources. These sources include data from SEIM systems, 
IDS systems, DLP systems, packet tracking systems, HR systems, etc. 
Each of the systems providing input into the CHAMPION reasoning sys-
tem has an associated domain ontology that provides the data model and 
typing for that domain. Stated another way, data from specialized 
domains have their own AMC regions in the framework. "Bridging" 
domain ontologies defining the correlations between concepts in different 
domains are also present. For example, suppose there are three domain 
ontologies: (a) a cyber-activity ontology, (b) a social-networking ontology, 
and (c) a document-leakage ontology. An example of a concept defined in 
the cyber-activity ontology would be a staff member performs an after-
hours large download (detection of this action comes from SEIM input). 
An example of a concept in the social-networking ontology would be a 
large upload to social media. In the document-leakage ontology, we 
could represent the concept of suspected document leak that could be 
defined as a combination of the after-hours large download and the 
large upload to social media. With even higher-level "abstractions" 
encoded in the knowledge representations, the system recognizes any of a 
number of exploits as equivalent (a print job is similar to a screen capture, 
storage of files on portable media, or uploading files to social media, etc.—
all represent possible methods of exfiltrating data). The reasoning frame-
work is therefore "set" to recognize activities that are consistent with pat-
terns defined lower in the reasoning hierarchy, as well as higher-order 
patterns that bridge across multiple domains of data. This provides a 
more sophisticated approach to monitoring and threat analysis than is 
typical in current practice by helping the analyst correlate data over space 
and time and across varied data sources. This continual monitoring and 
analysis to recognize these types of integrated patterns serves to decrease 
the cognitive load on the analyst and focus her attention on possible 
threats that present the most critical security risks.
Discussion
We have described the insider threat problem and a particular approach 
to proactively addressing the threat using an advanced belief propagation 
system that incorporates a variety of assessment data types. Two points 
are important to convey regarding this approach. First, it is useful to 
consider the problem addressed in more general terms, such as "problems 
in the workplace" or nonproductive behaviors in the workplace, and even 
issues of workplace violence. In particular, the insider threat problem is 
not limited to information technology attacks: consider the events of 
November 5, 2009, at Ft. Hood, Texas, where the accused perpetrator, 
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Army psychiatrist Maj. Nidal Hasan, allegedly opened fire at the Soldier 
Readiness Center, killing thirteen people and wounding forty-three 
others. According to some accounts, there is evidence that Maj. Hasan 
had contact with radical Islamist elements before his shooting spree.28 In 
addition to this alleged cyber-use evidence, Maj. Hasan exhibited 
behavioral and sociological indicators that could have systematically 
alerted his associates and superiors to the high risk he posed. Thus, for 
example, the U.S. army Fort Hood Internal Review Team Final Report 
provides specific recommendations for pre- and post-deployment 
behavioral screening to improve communication among patients, 
providers, and commanders;29 for health-care providers to provide 
information to commanders relating to indicators of possible violence; 
and for training of "… Soldiers to identify and report Soldiers that exhibit 
indicators of potential violence and/or potential terrorist behavior…" The 
technical approach to threat assessment that we have described in this 
article would certainly apply to this type of case, as well as to data 
leakage/exfiltration and espionage scenarios.
A second point concerning the generality of the approach is that the rea-
soning system developed here will address a broad class of decision ana-
lytic challenges facing the intelligence and counterintelligence 
communities today. Given the domain-independent structure of the 
CHAMPION reasoning system, it is straightforward (but not trivial) to 
apply this technology to problems in counterterrorism, weapons nonpro-
liferation, and related threat and warning analysis functions. The techni-
cal implementation underlying the reasoning framework is closely aligned 
with sense-making approaches to decision-support systems that have 
been promoted by the cognitive systems engineering research commu-
nity, especially the general framework that Gary Klein and collaborators 
have described as "Recognition-Primed Decision Making" (RPDM).30 
Indeed, we suggest that the approach described in the present article 
offers one method of implementing an operational version of a RPDM 
model.
Conclusion
The insider threat, especially espionage and data leakage involving com-
puter networks, is among the most pressing cyber-security challenges that 
threaten government and industry information infrastructures. Unfortu-
nately, no single intrusion detection or threat assessment technique in 
wide use today gives a complete picture of the insider threat problem. A 
predictive modeling approach to insider threat mitigation was described 
that aims to incorporate a diverse set of data sources that not only address 
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the cyber domain but also the psychological/motivational factors that 
may underlie malicious insider exploits. This comprehensive threat 
assessment framework promises to automate the detection of high-risk, 
concerning behaviors ("precursors" or "triggers") on which to focus the 
attention and inform the analysis of cyber-security personnel, who would 
otherwise be required to analyze and correlate an overwhelming amount 
of data. Incorporating psychosocial data along with cyber data into the 
analysis offers an additional dimension upon which to assess potential 
threats within a comprehensive, integrated threat analysis framework.
Current practice tends to be reactive, as it focuses on detecting malicious 
acts after they occur, with the aim of identifying and disciplining the per-
petrator. In addition, the cyber-security/insider threat analysis process 
puts the greatest demand on the analyst for correlating multiple sources 
and patterns of data to recognize potential threats. We have developed a 
model-based belief propagation framework that uses psychosocial indica-
tors as well as cyber indicators of potential abuse of network resources to 
identify and proactively respond to possible malicious exploits. Some 
indicators may be observed directly, while others are inferred or derived 
from observed data.
Defining triggers in terms of observable cyber and psychosocial indicators 
and higher-level aggregated patterns of these behaviors is a major chal-
lenge, but also a critical ingredient of a predictive methodology. The 
incorporation of psychosocial indicators is a serious matter that must be 
conducted with care to protect individual privacy. We have argued else-
where for the need to apply ethical standards in limiting the type of infor-
mation monitored and the access to such information by security 
analysts,31 while advocating that this is an attainable goal that both pro-
tects individual privacy and enables the organization to protect its mate-
rial, intellectual property, and personnel assets. Prerequisites for a valid 
deployment of this approach are effective training for management and 
HR personnel in recognizing and reporting behavioral precursors, estab-
lishment of policies and mechanisms for addressing insider threats 
through formation of interdisciplinary teams (representing management, 
HR, security, and counterintelligence perspectives), and proper safe-
guards and protection of the information from improper use or leakage. 
An informed and enlightened organization requires that management and 
HR staff be equipped with tools to maintain awareness of worker satisfac-
tion and well-being. However, these tools cannot overstep ethical and pri-
vacy boundaries. This allows the organization to respond thoughtfully, 
effectively, and proactively to situations that, if unaddressed, may other-
wise increase the risk of insider attacks. Further research and technology 
development along the lines described in this paper, as well as discussion 
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of social and ethical issues in employee monitoring, should remain among 
the highest priorities in addressing the insider threat.
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